A tentative ceasefire apart, destitution in Gaza still looms large and the futures of Lebanon and Syria remain unclear. The Middle East drug trade has grown, conflicts from the Sahel and Sudan are spilling over, and societal protests seek new outlets while the United Nations Security Council remains paralysed. We present a list of ten things to watch in the region as we move into 2025.
Domestic: Elections will reveal how authoritarian governments seek to manage discontent (e.g. Egypt, Iraq). Meanwhile, Arab street protests might evolve beyond Palestine solidarity movements. Islamist currents could benefit from continued outrage over the latest Gaza War.
Regional: Lebanon hangs between renewed ethnic strife and restored sovereignty after Hezbollah’s significant weakening while remaining highly dependent on developments in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Global inattention to Sudan emboldens violent actors and their allies. International NGOs and courts debate how to classify the war in Gaza legally, including accusations of genocide. There is a risk of conflict in the Sahel spilling over into North Africa.
International: The growing Middle East drug trade is attracting international scrutiny. There could be a new influx of migrants and refugees to Europe from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, but also from secular Israelis disenchanted with their government’s illiberal turn. The UNSC remains paralysed, pointing to the pivotal role the incoming Donald Trump administration will play in reshaping the regional order as well as the Israel–Iran conflict.
Policy Implications
The European Union needs to regain geopolitical weight to manage crises that affect it domestically. Stepping up as proactive mediator between the United States and regional players ensures that it gains a foothold. The Levant, the Sahel–North Africa nexus, Iran’s nuclear file, and Sudan must be considered equally as part of a broader strategy to manage increasingly intertwined regional crises.
Syria and Lebanon: Ethnic Strife or Reclaiming Sovereignty?
Lebanon stands at a crossroads. The weakening of Hezbollah presents an opportunity for national restoration, but the risk of ethnic strife is real.
After 14 months of conflict, the approval of a United States-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah signals a possible turning point for Lebanon (BBC 2024c). The Shia militia that has formed a state within a state for decades is militarily decimated and its Iranian supply routes via Syria are disrupted. This shift could usher Lebanon towards governance free from proxy Iranian influence – but only if the country can overcome extensive political and sectarian challenges.
The mass displacement of 1.3 million civilians (predominantly Shias) during the conflict adds further strain to Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance. Many of those displaced have returned to find their homes in ruins, heightening a sense of loss and vulnerability. These frustrations risk deepening divisions unless addressed inclusively.
The Christian Lebanese Forces, long critical of Hezbollah’s dominance, have seen rising support among those who feel sidelined by the latter’s influence (Politico 2024). As Hezbollah’s prominence wanes, calls for restoring state sovereignty have intensified. However, if these demands are framed in zero-sum terms, the risks of clashes between Hezbollah’s supporters and other factions will only increase.
The delicate balance that Lebanon now has to achieve lies in separating political movements out from the people they claim to represent and prioritising nation identity above sectarian myopia. Lebanon’s way out of its current crisis requires unity. Only by inviting all citizens to participate in a shared national future can it escape the legacies of division and build a sovereign, inclusive, and peaceful country instead.
At the same time, Lebanon’s easterly neighbour Syria is facing similar questions. The fall of Bashar al-Assad and of his regime on 8 December 2024 marks a seismic shift in Syria’s modern history. After more than a decade of brutal conflict, Syria now faces a critical juncture: Will the country fall into the grip of renewed ethnic and sectarian strife or can it chart a path towards restored sovereignty and national unity?
For years, Assad’s regime held the country together through a mix of authoritarian repression, patronage networks, sectarian favouritism, and war crimes (CBS News 2021). His downfall leaves behind a fractured state, where mistrust between different communities – Alawite, Christian, Druze, Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni – remains profound. The regime’s reliance on Alawite loyalists created resentment among Syria’s majority Sunni population, while Kurds have successfully carved out autonomous governance structures in the northeast of the country whose relationship with the national umbrella is as yet unclear.
The power vacuum emerging has already sparked fears of revenge and retaliatory violence. Alawite communities, seen as erstwhile pillars of the Assad regime, now face a particularly precarious future. Without clear assurances of protection and inclusion, they risk becoming targets of reprisal. Similarly, Sunni groups that suffered under Assad’s crackdown may now seek to assert dominance, potentially sidelining minorities and perpetuating cycles of exclusion and conflict. Workable and legal means of transitionary justice need to be found. Another major challenge will be the reintegration of millions of internally displaced Syrians as well as refugees who fled the conflict. Their return will be essential for national reconstruction, but it must be handled carefully to avoid rekindling old hostilities.
However, Syria’s fragility also presents an opportunity to rebuild a more inclusive and sovereign nation. The fall of Assad provides a chance to move beyond the sectarian and autocratic structures that defined his rule. The key to stability lies in crafting a national identity that transcends religious and ethnic divides, treating all Syrians as equal citizens first and foremost while leaving enough room for autonomy in the form of some kind of federalism – especially for the country’s Kurdish regions.
Both in Lebanon and Syria, these issues will be further complicated by the presence of external actors. The footprint of Iranian militias has vanished, but Israel, Turkey, and the US are all currently occupying parts of Syrian territory while it is as yet unclear whether Russia will have to give up its naval base in Tartus and its airfield in Hmeimim. Developments serving as a potential source of hope in both countries remain, as such, on shaky ground.
Sudan’s Overlooked Humanitarian Crisis: Global Inattention Fuels the War’s Regional Fire
On 15 April 2023, violence erupted in Khartoum between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdelfattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo’s command. In and outside the capital, combat conditions, supply lines, and political networks meant that neither the RSF nor the SAF could fully concentrate their firepower against the other, trapping them in a drawn-out stalemate. As local and regional militias hijacked the initial SAF–RSF conflict for their own goals, factionalism shattered the once clear-cut frontline. Since April 2023, Al-Burhan and Dagalo’s quagmire has plunged Sudan into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in recent history.
As of December 2024, up to 150,000 people had been killed and over 11.5 million displaced by the war (BBC 2024b; UNHCR 2024). Sexual violence is rampant and systemic, as is the forced recruitment of children by RSF soldiers alongside genocidal campaigns across Darfur using scorched-earth tactics reminiscent of previous wars. RSF fighters have also intentionally destroyed farming equipment, burned fields, and executed farmers to weaponise starvation against civilians (BBC 2024a). Famine has already been confirmed in Darfur, as have outbreaks of cholera and other diseases. At the same time, aid barely reaches those in need (UNICEF 2024).
Over the past year, Sudan unfortunately all but disappeared from the headlines. The war in Sudan should, however, be closely watched in 2025 because the lack of global attention means this conflict has the capacity to destabilise the region well beyond the Horn of Africa now. Al-Burhan, Dagalo, and their allies need a constant supply of weapons, ammunition, fuel, and other cargo from outside Sudan, but it is also vital to them that supply networks remain as under the radar as possible. International suppliers including Russia and its Africa Corps (formally Wagner Group), Khalifa Haftar in Libya, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran profit from the war especially because the risk of repercussions and accountability remain low. Away from the spotlight the country has become an armoury for and accessory to instability in the entire region, while the Sudanese people are left behind by the international community. That is why publicly talking about Sudan again is a major step towards starving the war’s increasingly uncontrollable fire of oxygen.
Spilling Over? Entanglements between the Sahel and Maghreb
The Maghreb, internally divided by diplomatic tensions, is characterised by its constituent countries’ varying approaches taken towards their shared southern neighbourhood. Most notably, Morocco and Algeria are pursuing infrastructure projects in the Sahel region, each aiming to expand their influence and counterbalance the other’s initiatives. Launched in February 2023, Morocco’s “Atlantic Initiative” seeks to provide landlocked Sahel countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean via Moroccan infrastructure. Conversely, Algeria announced in February 2024 a plan to establish free-trade zones with Sahel countries and to connect the region to its ports situated on the Mediterranean (El Yaaqoubi 2024). In the background, Russian influence in the Sahel, particularly in a military and security sense, is viewed negatively by both Algeria and Morocco. Algeria finds itself at odds with its traditional Russian ally, especially when it comes to Mali’s cancellation of the Algerian-supported peace agreement with the Azawad Tuareg rebel groups.
Despite their differences and open rivalry, though, the Maghreb nations share key security concerns that remain worth looking out for in 2025. The first concerns political instability and violent conflict, as Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali all experience military rule and jihadist insurgency. Transnational terrorist networks exploit state instability, power vacuums, and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Furthermore, cross-border criminal activities threaten regional security.
Second, strong migration flows from the Sahel position the Maghreb as a region of both transit and destination. Tunisia particularly faces significant challenges here: of the over 150,000 attempted Mediterranean crossings to Italy in 2023, two-thirds originated from there and the rest from Libya. In September 2024 Tunisia’s National Guard expelled migrants and refugees to the desert, making international headlines. In Algeria, the expulsion of thousands of migrants led to a diplomatic crisis with Niger in April 2024. Importantly, the whole African continent is severely affected by climate change, which, combined with widespread hopelessness among youth, will further drive attempts to cross the Mediterranean. A recent study found that 75 per cent of young Tunisians aspire to leave the country (Carthage Mag 2024).
That said, focusing solely on potential spillovers up north is insufficient. Violent conflict and instability in the Sahel intersect with persistent socio-economic mismanagement in the Maghreb. These interconnected challenges underscore the need for regional strategies to address shared grievances and prevent further destabilisation.
Much Ado about Something? Elections in 2025
With the biggest election year in human history just gone, during the course of which half of the world’s population cast their votes across 72 countries, the electoral landscape in the MENA region appears set to be relatively stagnant in 2025. While there have been persistent calls for early elections in Israel and Turkey, such outcomes remain unlikely in the current regional climate. In Qatar, a legislative election for the Shura Council had initially been anticipated; however, the constitutional referendum of November 2024 led to its replacement with a fully appointed council, signalling a shift away from electoral processes.
Iraq’s parliamentary elections, expected by October, come on the heels of the December 2023 provincial ones – the first in a decade – that were seen as a precursor to their national-level counterpart. The Iran-backed Coordination Framework emerged as the biggest winner in the country’s provincial elections. Their relatively strong performance and high public approval have solidified their power, whereas weakened Kurdish and Sunni positions in Baghdad limit the prospects of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s return.
Egypt is also due to hold parliamentary elections by late 2025. While President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi secured a third term in the 2024 elections, the House of Representatives remains far from serving as a meaningful check on presidential power. Dominated by the pro-Sisi Nation’s Future Party and their allies, opposition voices continue to be sidelined. Nonetheless, the elections retain significance as a barometer for the regime’s public approval and legitimacy.
In October 2024, Arab League member state Somalia saw its National Consultative Council announce in a joint communiqué that direct local elections would take place in June 2025, followed by regional parliamentary and leadership ones in September. Should they come to pass this will mark a historic milestone, with the country transitioning from its long-standing clan-based power-sharing system to an electoral-democratic one based on universal suffrage.
Libya could also head to the polls in 2025, following years of political instability and division in the wake of the 2011 uprising. In November 2024, the country successfully conducted the first round of municipal elections, marking a step towards restoring local governance. Encouraging further progress, the Head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi, has called for national elections to be held in 2025.
Lebanon had been without a president since 2022 due to political deadlock between its sectarian-based parties. The situation was further complicated by the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which concluded with a ceasefire brokered by the US and France. Only recently on 9 January 2025 did the Lebanese parliament finally succeed in electing General Joseph Aoun to the presidency. It remains to be seen whether this will help to improve notoriously elusive political stability in the country.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 of 2015 suggested that in a future political settlement Syria should hold elections after a constitutional process and an 18-month transition period to ensure stability. However, the country’s new de facto ruler Ahmad al-Sharaa cautioned in a recent television interview that the constitutional process and certification of voters via a population census might take three years. As such, he noted, it will be four years before elections can take place.
Table 1. Elections in the MENA Region in 2025
Country | Elections | Date |
Iraq | Parliamentary | TBC; by October 2025 |
Egypt | Parliamentary | TBC; by November 2025 |
Somalia | Local and regional | June–September 2025 |
Libya | Parliamentary and presidential | TBC |
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
Bread, Freedom, and Peace: Protest Movements
The year 2024 was marked by widespread protest movements in MENA countries over solidarity with Palestine. According to protest-event data, over 32,000 Palestine-related demonstrations occurred globally between 7 October 2023 and 31 October 2024 (Murillo and De Paris 2024). Nearly 14,000 demonstrations took place in the Middle East alone – some 91 per cent of which were driven by pro-Palestine or pro-Lebanon sentiment. Palestine (ranked 6th), Jordan (9th), Bahrain (10th), Lebanon (12th), and Tunisia (15th) are among the 15 countries worldwide seeing the highest numbers of such protests – a remarkable dynamic given their relatively small population sizes.
The Palestinian question has long been a vector for dissent in Arab states. Expressing solidarity with these people provided a platform for airing grievances when the political space was more closed, helping unite governments and citizens around a shared cause. Yet, political leaders appear to be worried such momentum could now turn into popular upheavals aiming to overthrow their rule. It is thus not surprising that 2024 saw rising repression against pro-Palestine activism in certain MENA countries. These state repertoires also link back to ongoing societal and geopolitical dynamics such as the normalisation of relations with Israel (Jordan, Morocco), sectarian conflict (Bahrain), and a divide between the government and the population at large (Jordan).
In 2025, we expect to see a continuation – if not intensification – of protest activity in response to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (both in MENA countries and in Europe as well as the Anglo-American world). One does not have to look further than in Israel itself to begin with. Mass demonstrations against the corruption of the Benjamin Netanyahu government and, more recently, its unwillingness to bring home the hostages from Gaza continue unabated.
While socio-economic protests in Arab states have never ceased completely, the surprise ousting of Assad in Syria could inspire old and new political protest movements to mobilise once again. It shows that once the wall of fear has been broken, even high levels of repression cannot secure autocratic rule forever. Should the opportunity arise, states seeing recent iterations of popular discontent such as Algeria, Egypt, or Tunisia may be potential sites of protest in 2025. If the transition in Syria fails to result in better living conditions across the board, unrest is expected to reappear depending on the country’s security situation.
A New Wave of Islamist Populism?
Islamism has long been proclaimed dead, and the year just gone seemed to reinforce this belief with the decimation of Islamist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah alongside the ongoing exilic predicament of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, the death of Islamism may have been greatly exaggerated. The devastation of the latest Gaza War and the global outrage accompanying it have created fertile ground for Islamists to reclaim narratives of resistance. In effect, Gaza may serve as a “kiss of life” for Islamist movements across the region.
First, Islamist political parties are likely to channel widespread societal frustration into political gains. In Jordan, the Islamic Action Front – the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood – thrived on anger over the continuing situation in Gaza and already tripled its parliamentary seats in 2024 while still only holding a minority in the Lower House. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party under Abdelilah Benkirane’s leadership is seeking to revive its base through vocal support for the Palestinian cause, too. Islamist actors capitalising on pro-Palestinian sentiment to voice populist rhetoric is expected to persist.
Second, following the Assad regime’s sudden collapse Syria risks becoming a new epicentre for jihadist mobilisation. Despite promises of stabilisation and broad societal inclusion, also regarding religious minorities, the prospect of another Islamic state under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) cannot be ruled out. Remnants of ISIS and other jihadist networks may likely exploit the chaotic transition. Meanwhile, the competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS for primacy heightens the risk of Syria turning into an Islamist patchwork, with governance dependent on whether HTS consolidates power.
Finally, the space for liberal Islam has significantly narrowed due to the re-politicisation of Muslim groups around the Gaza War and widespread perceptions of Western complicity. Instead, calls for global jihadism have transcended regional boundaries, raising the spectre of renewed global extremism and radicalisation. While its formal political influence has waned in several MENA states, the Gaza conflict, the fall of the Assad regime, and mounting socio-economic grievances across the region have provided Islamists – both moderate and extremist in nature – with a renewed platform.
Migrants and Refugees: New Influx or a Return?
The MENA region consists of migrant and refugee sender, transit, and host states: Turkey hosts three million Syrians at present; every third person in Lebanon is Syrian. More than half of the Jordanian population has Palestinian roots; Tunisia, Libya, and other North African states are important transit points for sub-Saharan Africans aiming to reach the European Union. The Gaza War, the demise of the Assad regime in December 2024, and growing antisemitism in different parts of the world all raise the prospect of new population movements.
Regarding Gaza, most of its people have been displaced multiple times since October 7th. They continue to live in inhumane conditions, meaning that according to the Geneva Convention of 1951 they would qualify as “refugees.” However, they cannot reach another state’s territory to request asylum due to the Israeli and Egyptian blockades of the Strip’s borders. Palestinians in Gaza thus are a so-called trapped population whose survival depends on a ceasefire being reached and on sufficient humanitarian aid being allowed in.
The end of the Syrian dictatorship raises questions regarding the country’s 12 million displaced persons living both elsewhere in the country and abroad. With Assad gone, a return may be possible after sufficient reconstruction has taken place. This could mean a significant demographic shift for major host states like Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey as well as for European countries like Germany. However, it remains unclear whether the transition from the old regime to a new one under the HTS-led insurgents and what comes next will be peaceful in nature. In any case, the country Syrians would return to is very different from the one they left, as its future government is uncertain, its economy and infrastructure largely destroyed, and the natural environment having suffered badly from both the civil war and the ravishes of climate change.
Finally, rising antisemitism globally may see an increase in Jews “making Aliyah” to Israel. That said, emigration numbers have been on the increase ever since October 2023. Israel’s multi-front war and concerns about its judicial reform and democratic backsliding may dampen aspirations to make the country home.
The UN’s Struggle to Act: Paralysed Yet Vital
The UN system has faced criticism for its seeming inability to maintain international peace and security. This is especially true for its Security Council and as regards the complex conflict dynamics in the Middle East. Because of the structural reliance on consensus at the UNSC, particularly by the veto-wielding five permanent members (P5) (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US), escalating divisions and conflicting interests have impeded the organ’s capacity to respond to global crises effectively. Over the course of the Israel–Hamas war, the protracted inability to reach a ceasefire due to disagreements between the UNSC’s P5 has brought the dysfunctionality of the system to the fore (see Figure 1 below).
On the ground, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East is set to face severe constraints on its operations should the ban promulgated by the Israeli Knesset actually come into effect. This will potentially exacerbate the UN’s legitimacy crisis, particularly if Israel’s efforts to establish alternatives succeed. In the same manner, along with the first veto related to Sudan during the latest voting round at the UNSC, the World Food Programme is struggling to deliver aid to the affected areas amid an acute hunger crisis.
Figure 1. Voting Patterns on the Israel–Hamas War at the UNSC, 2023–2024
Source: Authors’ own compilation, based on UNSC documents (Resolutions, Veto List) (2024).
Elsewhere, Tehran’s ambitions remain the key issue for the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). UNSC Resolution 2231, which underpins the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) and sets out Iran’s commitments, will come to an end in October 2025. In the meantime, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) are engaged in ongoing talks with Iran to resolve the deadlock surrounding its nuclear programme. As an outspoken critic of the UN system, Donald Trump returning to office could bring unexpected developments regarding the Iranian nuclear file. A further hardening of positions can be expected.
The demise of the Assad regime has brought a whole new set of complexities to the UN system as well. Recent closed consultations at the UNSC have aimed to address these evolving developments. The implications hereof for the UN Disengagement Observer Force peacekeepers tasked with overseeing the ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War are still unclear. Israeli troop movements into the buffer zone adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights and airstrikes on Syria are seen as breaches of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, complicating the UN’s peacekeeping mandate. Reconsideration of HTS’s designation as a terrorist organisation by the UN and others is a topic of growing debate.
The challenges for the UN system in maintaining its legitimacy, neutrality, and operational effectiveness in the Middle East keep increasing. The UNSC is at risk of becoming an arena for new political battles between its respective members. This situation is likely to persist unless underlying issues are addressed, including but not limited to consistent and constructive dialogue, a unified approach, and enforcement strategies.
Figure 2. The UN and the Territorial Status of the Golan Heights
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on UNDOF (2024).
Going Higher? Drug Production and Export
The mass export of Captagon, highly addictive amphetamine pills, has repeatedly made regional and global news in recent years. While the Rif in northern Morocco and the Biqa‘ Valley in eastern Lebanon have traditionally been key MENA illicit-drug-producing regions, the drastic expansion in the manufacturing of Captagon is a much more contemporary phenomenon – and a dynamic that is likely to continue playing out for the foreseeable future. Initially developed as easy-to-produce pills for Syrian fighters in the country’s civil war post-2011, Captagon manufacturing since 2015 has mainly been geared towards export, typically to the resource-rich Gulf countries. In recent years, Captagon exports have exponentially grown and become transnational in nature – with related busts also being made in Europe, including in the Port of Hamburg (Rose and Shaar 2024). There are hence strong indications of Captagon transit routes via Northern European as well as Mediterranean port cities, from where the drug is then exported to the Gulf.
Despite its massive counternarcotics operations in recent years, Turkey has become a “sanctuary” for traffickers and the country’s ports have turned into convenient passage hubs for illicit drugs heading from Latin America to Russia, EU countries, and the Gulf. Hezbollah has also generated sizeable funds from its drug trade with Latin American producers. Captagon was a major source of income for the Assad dictatorship, rendering the country’s regime-controlled areas a kind of collective “narco state.” It is an open question what will happen to this lucrative business now: whether Syria’s new rulers will partly embrace or fully suppress it remains to be seen. Given its highly addictive nature, Captagon and its negative health impacts are increasingly becoming a major challenge for Middle Eastern societies, especially Syria itself but also neighbouring Jordan, Saudi Arabia, as well as the smaller Gulf countries.
On the other hand, the legalisation of cannabis for therapeutic and industrial uses in Morocco stands as a regional outlier. Following the adoption of the related law in 2021, the country’s nascent therapeutic-cannabis industry is projected to generate EUR 400 to 600 million in annual revenues from exports to the EU (Le Monde 2024). This was also accompanied by over 4,800 royal pardons being issued to individuals previously involved in cannabis farming. On a related note, Algeria’s decision to re-establish visa requirements for Moroccan citizens has been in part justified by accusations of drug trafficking.
Between Containment and Confrontation: Trump, Netanyahu, and the Iranian Nuclear Threat
Trump left the White House first time around with a legacy of “maximum pressure” towards Tehran policy-wise. As he prepares to assume office again, his rhetoric and staff nominations suggest that he intends to pick up where he left off. His return to the presidency comes at a critical juncture for the Middle East. Efforts to revive the JCPOA under President Joe Biden got bogged down in 2022, leaving Tehran’s nuclear programme to potentially reach breakout capacity unchecked (Brewer and Rome 2023). The fall of Assad and a weakened Hezbollah have introduced new uncertainties regarding the course of the Israeli–Iranian relationship, whereby the latter’s faltering regional strategy of proxy war may lead Teheran to reconsider the value of nuclear deterrence going forwards.
Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is presenting a more pragmatic image than his predecessor; in practice, he has simultaneously re-engaged diplomatically with the E3 while also doubling down on his country’s nuclear programme. Leveraging its threshold nuclear status while hoping to secure unlikely sanctions relief from the EU before 20 January 2025, the regime is cautious about the value of diplomacy with the West during a Trump administration – particularly because of the geopolitical implications of close alignment between the latter and Israel.
Buoyed by such unwavering US support, the entrenched far-right coalition under Netanyahu may escalate its stand-off with Iran. One potential means of doing that is pre-emptive military action against its nuclear facilities. This would have far-reaching consequences for regional stability, not least seeing the prospective unravelling of the tentative Saudi–UAE–Iran détente that has been fostered under Chinese mediation.
While Trump’s re-election signals a return to the politics of confrontation, his aversion to the Middle East’s “forever wars” might act as a moderating force here. He has prioritised punitive economic measures and targeted strikes over broader military commitments in the past. Although outsourcing the burden for ensuring regional security to local partners such as Israel may be in line with Trump’s “America First” maxim, the risk of the US being dragged into full-scale confrontation by Israel’s gambling on how best to proceed may steer his administration towards a path of more muted Iranian containment instead.
This GIGA Focus deviates from the series’ typical format. It is the joint product of several GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies staff members. Houssein Al Malla contributed the section on Lebanon and Syria, Hager Ali authored the part on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, Clara-Auguste Süß and Khalil Dahbi wrote the one on conflicts in the Sahel spilling over into North Africa. Hakkı Taş wrote the section on regional elections. Maria Josua and Clara-Auguste Süß addressed protest movements in the region. Hakkı Taş looked at the rise of Islamist populism. Christiane Fröhlich examined possible migrant and refugee developments. Olena Osypenkova, Diba Mirzaei, and Elianne Shewring authored the section on the paralysis of the UN. André Bank, Ardahan Özkan Gedikli, and Khalil Dahbi analysed the growing importance of drug production in and export from the MENA. Nils Lukacs and Kamran Matin looked at the implications that a Trump White House could have on Israel–Iran relations. Diba Mirzaei and Eckart Woertz jointly edited this GIGA Focus.
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