The BRICS+ Summit in Kazan, Russia: Five Things to Watch

With the admission of four new members in January 2024, BRICS+ has become a prominent player in global politics. The upcoming Kazan summit will see debates about further strategic expansion, de-dollarisation, and other initiatives favoured by host country Russia. Yet, internal complexities should temper any expectations of impactful outcomes.

• Collectively, BRICS+ member states strive to present themselves as the voice of the Global South.

• Since many countries have expressed an interest in joining the bloc, the question of expansion is expected to be on the table again. Nevertheless, the focus will probably be on precise accession criteria and the introduction of BRICS “partner-country status” rather than on further increasing the number of formal members at this point in time.

• Russia is likely to exploit its position as host country to promote its own initiatives and geopolitical as well as economic interests.

• De-dollarisation, a recurring theme in the discussions taking place among BRICS+ members, illustrates the group’s strategic vision for the future. Despite the lofty aspirations here, the policy’s swift implementation is unlikely.

Policy Implications

While far-reaching decisions are unlikely to emerge from the summit as internal tensions persist, BRICS+ is undeniably gaining influence in and with the Global South. Especially so if the current discontent with Western-led institutions only continues to grow. The challenge for Germany and its allies lies in recognising this shifting landscape and offering a more attractive alternative.

From BRICS to BRICS+

On 22 October 2024, heads of state will gather in Kazan, Russia, to preside over the first official summit of the BRICS+, with its now 10 member states. The summit’s motto is “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security.” This coming together is a major opportunity for Russia to showcase its international status and involvement in international politics. According to Russian sources, over 200 BRICS+ events at all levels will have occurred by the time the summit takes place (Russian 2024 BRICS Chairmanship 2024).

The most recent BRICS Summit, in 2023, surprised policymakers, media, and the general public alike with the announcement of the decision to expand the group’s membership, in the process becoming what is now known as “BRICS+”; Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were all invited to join (see Figure 1 below). Under its new president, Javier Milei, Argentina has since declined while Saudi Arabia’s status remains somewhat ambivalent. Until recently, Riyadh was still “considering” the membership offer it had; nevertheless, it has participated as an “invited member” in a number of important BRICS+ events already. While pursuing such expansion had been a topic of debate for years, internal disagreements appeared to stand in its way. Hence, the fact that member states found a consensus on this key topic was observed with some concern by the European Union and the United States.

Figure 1. BRICS’s Expansion Over Time

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

Notes: Based on various Russian sources (including Kostina 2024), with due caveats about accuracy.

Whereas the group’s global prominence has increased in recent years, its geopolitical and geoeconomic impact remains to be seen over the longer term. Although the expansion of BRICS to BRICS+ has led to between a small to moderate increase on some economic indicators – such as the share of global gross domestic product, which has potentially risen by slightly over 3 per cent for example (see also, Infographic on BRICS, BRICS plus, and the G7: a look at the global economy) –, the group has significantly enhanced its broader global economic influence through the consolidation of strategic resources (mainly at the expense of major oil and gas producers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), obtaining greater access to pivotal trade routes as well as extending its influence across the African continent.

The inclusion of additional, sizable states from the Global South going forwards is a further signal of the group’s global aspirations. In 2024, the Russian Federation is seeking to leverage the collective economic and geopolitical power of the BRICS+ countries in its attempts to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and strengthen its own global status. In light of these developments, highlighted are “Five Things to Watch” when looking at the summit’s outcomes and its consequences for global politics in the years ahead.

Issue 1: A Summit with and in Russia

This year’s chairmanship of BRICS+ provides Russia with the opportunity to enhance its geopolitical influence and to promote its narrative around a “multipolar world order.” Moscow is keen on presenting itself as engaged in joint economic projects with countries of the Global South and seeks to bolster relations with other BRICS+ members to counterbalance Western attempts to isolate it both economically and diplomatically in the wake of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia’s keen efforts here have been evident throughout the summit’s organisation. The host city Kazan, for instance, capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, has since 2009 been the location and brand for the so-called Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum aimed at deepening relations with Middle Eastern (and now also with Asian) partners. This choice is symbolic and a gesture towards the “Asian Continent” and “the Islamic World,” key prospective allies in Russia’s contemporary foreign policy (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023).

For BRICS members, both long-standing and newly admitted ones, it will be crucial to monitor how they respond to any efforts by Russia to co-opt them into supporting its strategic agenda, as expected to be accompanied by waves of propaganda. Countries like India and South Africa, along with many of the new member states, have consistently emphasised their commitment to non-alignment or multilateralism. Balancing Russia’s influence as host country with their desire to maintain independence from its anti-Western stance will require careful diplomatic manoeuvring.

Russia’s chairmanship of BRICS+ has offered Moscow significant opportunities to strengthen its diplomatic outreach to the Global South, particularly on conflicts that it is seeking to shape the narrative around. In April, for instance, BRICS+ discussed the current crises in Gaza, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen, all ones in which Russia has pursued its own geopolitical interests (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2024a). At the High-Level Security Officials’ Meeting of BRICS+ Countries, held from 10–12 September 2024 in Saint Petersburg, the war in Ukraine was a core focus. Russia’s leadership has used these platforms to advance its anti-Western rhetoric, accusing the latter of double standards when it comes to international conflicts – a recurring theme in Moscow’s broader messaging. The potential escalation of conflict between Israel and Iran, a new BRICS+ member, has seen this dynamic intensify further.

Other members, particularly Brazil and China, may use the BRICS+ platform to enhance their own diplomatic outreach, especially with their joint “Friends for Peace” initiative aimed at resolving the Ukraine conflict. Yet, Kyiv strongly opposes their proposed peace plan. None of the BRICS+ members, in turn, have endorsed the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework for Ukraine from the June 2024 Summit for Peace in Switzerland signalling the broader desire for an independent multilateral platform.

Issue 2: Effects of Expansion

After the announcement of BRICS’s expansion in August 2023, two conflicting reactions could be seen. One perspective highlighted the growing heterogeneity of BRICS+, pointing to its diversity of regime types, cultures, and identities; it was argued that this undermined the group’s overall effectiveness. Concerns were also raised here about the “internalisation” of bilateral conflicts within BRICS+, such as the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia as well as tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, potentially complicating decision-making processes within the bloc. The opposing view, often expressed with a sense of wariness, emphasises the rising geopolitical weight of BRICS+ and its increasing attractiveness to countries of the Global South. Expansion is taken here as a sign of the group’s growing influence on the global stage, with more nations expressing an interest in joining and thus amplifying its role as a counterbalance to Western-led institutions.

Both perspectives hold merit. While the selection of countries to which to offer BRICS membership in August 2023 did not follow any formal criteria – there is, in fact, no such defined list –, a strong Chinese–Russian alliance played a key role in shaping the latest round of expansion. This influence may impact how these new BRICS+ members – especially those with relatively high dependency on China and/or Russia, for instance regarding trade, foreign and/or military aid, or grain imports – engage with the bloc moving forwards. Notably, the turn to the Middle East aligns with the broader regional strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is similarly dominated by the Chinese–Russian partnership. The SCO recently admitted Iran as a full member and welcomed Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as dialogue partners, signalling Moscow’s new focus on the “Eastern vector” in its foreign policy.

This alignment underscores especially Russia’s (but also China’s) efforts to deepen ties in the Middle East, strengthening its geopolitical influence across both BRICS+ and the SCO. This also makes the UAE an attractive partner as an investment destination, above all for China, but also as a member that brings to the table not only oil but also strength in the realms of technology and sustainable development, further to its extensive trade and political networks across the region. For China, the UAE is indeed its most significant economic partner in the Arab world, facilitating 60 per cent of the East Asian country’s trade passing through its ports for re-export across the Middle East and North Africa region (The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024). Saudi Arabia, which is also a full member of the BRICS’s New Development Bank, adds to the group’s economic weight and brings in considerable assets in terms of financial muscle and fossil fuel reserves. It, in turn, benefits from the potential diversification of its economic ties. While traditionally a US ally, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, adjusted their stance towards a more “neutral” pragmatism. This is also visible beyond BRICS+, for instance in Saudi Arabia’s decision to closely cooperate with Russia within OPEC+. Riyadh’s role in BRICS+ thus will be one of the summit’s most intriguing prospects, yet doubts about its willingness to fully commit to the group persist.

Whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as noted, are clear assets, the inclusion of Iran has raised many questions regarding the possibility of other BRICS+ members adopting a non-aligned stance. Tehran is a valuable ally for Moscow amid its war in Ukraine for its arms supplies. However, their military cooperation dates back to the Syrian conflict. Iran is the most heavily sanctioned country in the world and a pivotal player in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East; it now is at risk of full-blown war with Israel, too. Its relations with Saudi Arabia have been tense for years. The membership benefits for Iran are obvious, as its inclusion in BRICS+ signals to the rest of the world that it is not isolated but part of an attractive and increasingly powerful grouping.

Egypt, which has been in economic turmoil in the past few years (African Development Bank Group 2024), brings to the table, above all, its geostrategic location and the importance of the Suez Canal to global supply chains, while China’s relevance to the country’s ports is steadily increasing. Moreover, Egypt remains the largest importer of Russian grain; the historical bond between the two countries can be traced back to Soviet times. Yet, the North African country is not the only BRICS+ member under severe economic stress.Ethiopia is Africa’s fifth-largest economy in terms of GDP, yet it has come under considerable strain – partially as a result of the ongoing impact of the Tigray War and also due to a severe drought in the Somali region, one that the United Nations Sustainable Development Group described as the “worst in 40 years.” Given its status as a developing country with immense need for external financial assistance, Ethiopia is likely to seek the latter from its fellow BRICS+ members, with Chinese foreign direct investment at the forefront. The East African country has demonstrated a cautiously conciliatory approach towards Russia in the UN General Assembly. It was absent on 2 March 2022 when the UNGA passed its first resolution on “Aggression against Ukraine.” In October of the same year, in the vote on the one on the “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” Ethiopia along with Iran and three other BRICS+ members (China, India, and South Africa) abstained – whereas, for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would vote in favour of both.

BRICS+ has become more diverse, now comprising a broader and more heterogeneous group of countries, some of which have longstanding bilateral conflicts with one another. However, what especially Western observers often seem to miscalculate is that the simultaneity of conflict and cooperation is not per se a challenge to BRICS+’s successful functioning. Instead, all members approach the grouping with pragmatism or even transactionalism. This is exemplified for example by the new South African government, which points with fervour towards the economic/development-finance dimension of the BRICS+ that remains the grouping’s most important component for them (Foreign Policy 2024). On potentially contentious issues – including the war in Ukraine, relations with the US, and G7 involvement –, it is unlikely that the group will come up with meaningful resolutions any time soon.

The new BRICS+ members are expected to readily embrace the group’s established rhetoric, advocating for stronger multilateral cooperation and emphasising the importance of inclusivity vis-à-vis global governance and international institutions – key themes that have emerged time and again in recent Summit Declarations. Many of these new faces are likely to focus on envisaged economic benefits and market expansion, which have historically been among the group’s core goals. Overall, the inclusion of additional members is unlikely to significantly alter BRICS+’s decision-making dynamics, whether in terms of limiting or increasing its capacity for collective action. However, it is essential not to underestimate the symbolic significance of this expansion, particularly for other countries in the Global South. Many of these nations view BRICS+ as a platform that can elevate their standing in global politics, helping them move beyond marginalisation. This is not to say that they share Russia’s ambition to establish BRICS+ as an anti-Western alliance, but they see the group as an economically and politically valuable and relatively “low-cost” way to diversify global partnerships and to develop relations beyond the West (but not against it).

Issue 3: The More the Merrier?

The upcoming summit is crucial for establishing who the next potential candidates for membership are and for determining the group’s plans in the near future. As Russian sources suggest, 28 countries have expressed a willingness to join BRICS+ (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Chad, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Honduras, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Palestine is also additionally mentioned in some sources). Several of those in question have submitted official applications, including Malaysia and Thailand. Yet, there are still no formal criteria for accession. At a BRICS+ Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in June 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov indeed announced a halt to strategic expansion. Instead, he outlined the development of a “partner-country model,” akin to the “observer status” seen in other institutions. According to Yuri Ushakov, the aide to the President of Russia, these “partners” will not participate in the decision-making process but be included instead in discussions and various organisational structures (TASS 2024b).

What qualifies a state as a potential BRICS+ member thus remains unclear. At the summit, it will be interesting to observe how existing members discuss this issue. They will have to balance their claims and aspirations to more inclusive multilateralism and the growing expectation of an increasing number of states from the Global South joining with their own reservations over further expansion and the need to take joint decisions. Looking at statements coming from Russia, it is likely that the aforementioned model will indeed be implemented and several aspirants will thus be invited to join as partners on the promise of formal membership in future. This does not mean that exceptions will not be made potentially for especially “attractive” new members such as Turkey, a NATO country and among the world’s twenty-largest economies. Its admission would be both symbolically and economically significant, making it a particularly interesting case to monitor. Formally, Ankara remains committed to its traditional alliance with NATO and the EU accession process. Since the early 2010s, however, Turkey has sought to enhance its diplomatic and economic partnerships with non-Western powers (particularly China and Russia) as well as with emerging economies, while nurturing an increasingly anti-Western discourse domestically.

In July 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey was seeking full membership of the SCO (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications 2024). In contrast to the latter’s more formal structure and core focus on security, BRICS+ is primarily an economic forum with the potential to help enhance the country’s geopolitical standing. The Turkish government has made clear that joining the group would not affect its membership of NATO. However, the current approach to the EU seems to be a matter of great delicacy. As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted, had his government’s rapprochement with the supranational body been more successful then other options would not even be on the table (The Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024). Whether the interest in BRICS+ is as a tool to strengthen their bargaining position with the EU is thus uncertain. Yet Ankara’s membership of the group has support from Moscow, and while Beijing has made no official statements endorsing it the East Asian country has, nevertheless, consistently demonstrated support for expansion in principle. Turkey is part of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and may become a hub for the distribution of Russian gas in addition to ongoing negotiations over nuclear- and renewable-energy projects. A move towards BRICS+ has many benefits and few costs for Turkey. In light of the intention to hone the group’s accession criteria and introduce only partner status for now, formal membership for current aspirants is unlikely. The Kazan summit will show whether states are willing to make an exception for Turkey.

Issue 4: De-Dollarisation and Dreams of a BRICS+ Currency

De-dollarisation and the creation of alternative payment options are among the most consensual ambitions of BRICS+. The former was already an important topic in Johannesburg in 2023, as BRICS warned about the US’s ability to use its “dollar hegemony” against other states. Thus, some movement on this issue is likely. It is among the key concerns of European and US observers vis-à-vis closer BRICS+ cooperation. Yet, several caveats are in order. First, de-dollarisation does not automatically imply the development of a common currency, along the lines of the euro, but may also refer to other payment mechanisms (e.g. cryptocurrencies) or simply the replacement of the dollar with national currencies in bilateral trade deals. Establishing a genuine alternative to the dollar, which accounts for up to 60 per cent of global foreign-exchange reserves (see Figure 2 below), is extremely ambitious. Indeed, vast divergence in terms of members’ respective levels of economic development and political systems, not to mention a fundamental lack of trust between them, remain obstacles to de-dollarisation overall.

Figure 2. Global Foreign-Exchange Reserves by Currency (in Billion USD), 2015–2024

Source: International Monetary Fund 2024.

BRICS members’ search for alternative payment systems is nothing new. In 2018, for instance, Russia proposed the creation of a BRICS currency basket comparable to the “Special Drawing Rights” of the International Monetary Fund (Lissovolik 2018). As with most proposals in this area, it never took off due to the necessary conditions for this kind of far-reaching joint endeavour not being in place. Following the events beginning February 2022, however, the subsequent widespread sanctions against Russia and its removal from the SWIFT payment system have seen its (and other BRICS+ states’) aspirations to search for often technologically advanced options deepen so as to, in case, secure their financial transactions against external interference.

A first step here has been experimentation with central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and other digital financial assets (DFAs). China has launched the e-CNY, a digital yuan, and is developing the so-called Multiple CBDC bridge platform (mBridge), a collaborative project involving a number of central banks from, among other places, China, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and the UAE. The first payment through this platform using the digital dirham was made between the UAE and China in January 2024. This potentially eliminates the need for traditional banks or tangible currencies like the dollar. The project is still in the pilot stage.

As Russian Deputy Finance Minister Ivan Chebeskov pointed out, several initiatives such as BRICS Bridge, BRICS Clear, and BRICS Insurance are on the agenda in 2024 (TASS 2024a). The first of these, a multilateral digital-payment platform based on blockchain technology, would allow real-time, cross-border payments. It may also see digital currencies presided over by member states’ central banks form part of financial settlements. Yet even if all members approved, the actual implementation of any of these projects would require coordinated legislative action. Again, the issue of economic and political heterogeneity among BRICS+ members – and, not to be underestimated, their lack of mutual trust –, is likely to stand in the way of fast and effective implementation.

Some inroads have been made, at least, on increasing the use of national currencies in intra-BRICS trade. At a G20 meeting on the sidelines of the 79th Session of the UNGA, held on 25 September 2024, Lavrov stated that:

The share of national currencies in Russia’s settlement with the SCO and the Eurasian Economic Union countries has exceeded 90 per cent […] and the share of the dollar in the BRICS payments pattern is currently below 29 per cent. (The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2024b)

Yet, even in the context of this most plausible form of de-dollarisation, reservations persist. First, it is in the interest of all states, even the majority of BRICS+ members, to have one dominant currency that is stable, reliable, and trusted undergird the international financial order. Only the dollar fulfils this need at present (see Figure 3 below). Second, all parties are acutely aware that, under current circumstances, even a gradual withdrawal from the dollar would go hand in hand with growing dependency on the Chinese yuan. This implies exchanging one (known, stable, and relatively free-flowing) form of dependency with another (state-controlled) version thereof. India, especially, is certain to avoid going down this path.

Figure 3. Currency Fluctuations against the USD, 2004–2024

Source: International Monetary Fund 2024.

Thus, while establishing alternative forms of payment is extremely important to Russia, it may not be as high on the agenda for the group’s other members. Intra-BRICS+ trade is simply not extensive enough yet overall, and is for the most part made up of bilateral deals between China and the other individual BRICS+ members. Also, the economic and political foundations for deeper integration are currently absent; their emergence will not become more likely with enlarged membership, either.

Issue 5: BRICS+ Grain Exchange

Much attention has been paid to both the direct geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of BRICS’s existence as well as to its expansion. This means that other issue areas have received less scrutiny to date, despite their potential impact especially in and for the Global South. One of these overlooked matters is food security and the related trade in agricultural goods. Russia is a major player in global grain exports, especially wheat. According to its own data, as of December 2023 overall exports of grain and grain products reached 79.9 million tons – a 58 per cent increase from the previous year (Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision 2024). Its control of grain supplies thus gives it huge leverage on the global stage. These exports are focused on the Middle East (circa 40 per cent), Africa (c. 24 per cent), and Asia (c. 28 per cent). Among BRICS+ members, Egypt is heavily dependent on Russian wheat while Saudi Arabia significantly increased its imports in the season 2022/2023.

In April 2024 Moscow proposed a multilateral grain-trade platform, the BRICS+ Grain Exchange. The issue was also discussed at the 14th Meeting of BRICS+ Agriculture Ministers on 28 June of this year. From Russia’s perspective, the creation of a unified platform would facilitate trade in national currencies and provide for greater control over pricing mechanisms, also of basic agricultural products more generally; hitherto, Western ones such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange have dominated here. Major BRICS+ commodity exports are among the assets designated for trade on the exchange, such as wheat and other grains from Russia, rice from India, and soy and maize from Brazil.

BRICS+ states have expressed their support for the initiative. Yet, concrete plans for its realisation are still in their infancy. The development of a fully functional platform adjustable to the intricacies of the global market would require precise planning and highly coordinated action among group members. Included here might be the establishment of rules for pricing within the unified trading mechanism, a transparent legal framework, and additional logistical infrastructure for direct trading; all this is highly ambitious, albeit not impossible, within the current BRICS+ setting. With the publicity that the upcoming summit promises the Russian government, though, Moscow will likely seek to promote this initiative as part of its strategy to strengthen its overall economic resilience and standing within the global agricultural market. As a realistic area of cooperation among BRICS+ members, close attention must be paid at this and future summits to this key issue.

Global Implications of the 16th BRICS+ Summit

BRICS, and since 2024 BRICS+, summits have become a focal point of discussion regarding the future of the global order, the polarisation of world politics, and the reform of international institutions. The upcoming BRICS+ Summit in Kazan, Russia, is no exception. There is a strong expectation that the group will renew its calls for a restructuring of global governance, including of the UN Security Council and Bretton-Woods Institutions. The time appears ripe for such efforts, following the UNGA’s recently concluded “Summit for the Future” of September 2024 that introduced several new proposals regarding such reform.

Internal tensions within BRICS+ make significant breakthroughs on this issue unlikely, however. Russia, for example, has shown little enthusiasm for UNSC reform, fearing a dilution of its influence. Wary of its rival to the southwest, China opposes India’s bid for a permanent seat. Even within Africa divisions persist, with both Egypt and Ethiopia contesting South Africa’s regional leadership. This pattern of fragmentation mirrors the difficulties BRICS+ members face in promoting a unified vision of reform within other global institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, even if there is, in general, a sense of great unity and motivation to bring these reforms to fruition.

Internal frictions are also likely to impede joint engagement in mediation in the Middle East. BRICS+ states have been active in the region’s numerous conflicts and made related statements, above all in support of the Palestinians, yet concrete action is thin on the ground as, among other things, Sunni–Shi’ite divisions play out within BRICS+, too. China and Russia maintain their respective strategic allegiances to different factions. Despite the ambitious rhetoric, the reality is that deep-rooted divides within BRICS frequently lead to non-events or symbolic declarations with little in the way of follow through.

From the perspective of its key relevance to German foreign policy, however, the significance of BRICS+ should not be underestimated. While internal tensions persist, China’s and Russia’s growing alignment is undeniably gaining influence and could become a gravitational force for many nations of the Global South, especially as discontent with Western-led institutions only continues to grow. The challenge for Germany and its allies lies in recognising this shifting landscape and offering a more attractive alternative, especially as the majority of the democratic BRICS+ members, at least, are keen to stress that it is not and will not become an anti-Western grouping. The upcoming G20 Summit in Brazil may offer a good opportunity to showcase the benefits of such partnership, as will the announced advances towards the conclusion of the EU–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement. Germany and its allies need to avoid exercising pressure or ascribing blame by portraying BRICS+ membership as an inherently anti-Western stance. Instead, the concerns of BRICS+ members specifically and the Global South in general on the necessity of institutional reform, less paternalistic trading and development practices, greater equity in the climate change regime, and so forth need to be taken very seriously.

Acknowledgement

The authors thank Eduardo Valencia for the extensive work with databases and the development of the interactive map and graphs.

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