Russland in Afrika: Motive, Strategien und Effekte

Russia's Return to Africa: What are Motives, Strategies and Effects?

Stephan Ahlf and Matthias Basedau

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation's foreign and African policy has gained significant attention and the African continent, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has become much more geopolitically and economically important, as both Russia and European states, as well as numerous other actors, will be vying for influence and allies there.

Numerous observers and media reports have been pointing to increased Russian activities in the region for some time - after the end of the Soviet Union led to a sharp decline in Russian presence. How can Russia's role in Africa be classified? What are Russia's motives and what strategies are being pursued to achieve them? What are the immediate and possible long-term effects of these strategies? How should they be responded to?

A more comprehensive, mainly qualitative analysis notes both economic and ideological motives. The "ideological" goals refer less to a differentiated worldview than to the pursuit of a global political status for Russia, not least in relation to and in distinction from the West. The means or strategies include firstly development and foreign economic policy, which can be broken down into various sub-areas, and secondly soft power, among other things in the form of cooperation in the field of education. Both serve mainly to promote trade and investment. The third strategy consists of the pronounced use of propaganda and disinformation and, like the soft power strategy, on the one hand promotes Russia's standing and image in the United Nations (UN), in the wider world public and in the African target societies. On the other hand, however, it also has a distinctly offensive objective by portraying the West as an "imperialist" or "colonialist" actor and delegitimising the Western liberal-democratic model of society and promoting Russia's historical merits and the authoritarian Russian model. This strategy corresponds to a fourth approach, which can be called regime security: Russian actors make the governments of target states dependent on Russian security actors such as the "Wagner Group" and allow the penetration of states in foreign and security policy as well as the extraction of raw materials up to the quasi-takeover of these sectors. Other relevant aspects are food and energy security. Furthermore, the concept of security includes political protection against external (Western) influences primarily through UN vetoes and secondarily through arms supplies and various other forms of military cooperation. This strategy also helps to promote Russia's global political status, but at the same time ensures favourable investments and extractions for foreign currency illegally transferred to Russia due to financial sanctions. In the process, Russian actors appear to interact with organised crime.

The first immediate effect is the balance of trade, which is directly attributable to Russia's development and foreign economic policies and has grown over the last decade despite - or because of - Western sanctions. However, beyond security-related goods, i.e. mainly arms, this magnitude will not translate into other influence on the target states as in the case of China. The second effect is in the volume of investment, which is also due to development and foreign trade policies. Russia has signed a high number of memoranda of understanding, some of which, however, have been pending implementation for many years. Russia will not succeed in isolating Europe from fossil fuels from Africa due to its own financing problems. Moreover, Russia itself has had supply problems with strategic raw materials such as bauxite. The third effect relates to the foreign policy behaviour of African states towards Russia. This behaviour is influenced by Russia's soft power, propaganda and, above all, security policy activities. Overall, African states' foreign policy behaviour towards Russia seems to be influenced less by Russia but by resentment towards the West on the one hand and other non-Western actors such as China in particular on the other. In view of the critical arguments against the West often put forward behind closed doors by African heads of state and diplomats, the voting behaviour in the United Nations can rather be chalked up to a success of Western influence.

The fourth effect relates to democracy and civil liberties. Here, the establishment of a direct causality is hardly possible so far. Especially in Southern Africa and West Africa, where democratic and liberal institutions are comparatively strong, Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns are concentrated, threatening democratic standards that have been achieved. The fifth effect is (in)security. Russia's support for regime security tends to lead to more insecurity in the countries concerned. It remains unclear to what extent this is part of Russia's overall strategy, which seems to bear an opportunistic trait by preferentially strengthening Russian activities where instability already exists. The sixth effect relates to organised crime, often in the form of illegal trade. Corresponding activities correlate with insecurity or violent conflicts. It is likely that Russian intelligence services, the Russian mafia and especially the network of Yevgeny Prigozhin, which probably represents the nexus of these two worlds, cooperate with African organised crime in order to launder money on the one hand and to penetrate the target states and societies on the other. Existing structures in Central Africa in particular, but also in West Africa (cocaine trafficking), for example, are vulnerable to such Russian infiltration.

Longer-term effects on African countries or the entire region can currently only be formed within the framework of well-founded speculation or in the form of scenarios. Developments to watch out for include, first of all, the continuation or outcome of the Ukraine war. On the one hand, this concerns factors that could restrict Russia's activities. These include the reduced availability of Ukrainian and Russian energy raw materials, agricultural products, defence products and the personnel capabilities of the "Wagner Group". On the other hand, there are possible developments and factors to be observed that could increase Russian engagement. These include the continuation of sanctions - as an incentive to circumvent them in Africa - and a possible solidification of the global confrontation between Russia, other actors such as China and the West. Secondly, the future behaviour of other external actors from the Middle East such as Turkey and Gulf states, Western powers central to Africa such as France and the US, and international and regional organisations such as the UN and ECOWAS must be considered. Last but not least, long-term global and Africa-specific trends such as climate change and population development or the rise of jihadist violence must be taken into account. However, the conclusion is evident: Russian engagement has the potential to destabilise the region or individual countries in the long term.

The German government and its allies are already aware of this challenge. As part of a reformulation of German foreign and Africa policy, a well-thought-out and prudent long-term strategic response is needed that responds to challenges in a targeted manner and, in particular, takes into account the behaviour of actors other than Russia: In the trade sphere, Russia is not a dangerous competitor in the long term, although Russian - and other - efforts to control strategic raw materials and the financing of Russian (state) actors via conflict minerals in particular need to be monitored. Germany and its allies should provide a clear response in the area of soft power and propaganda and disinformation. This will include assertively representing democratic values without imposing specific Western models of forms of democracy on African states. In the field of communication, efforts must be stepped up to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation with an effective response. This also includes the promotion of networks, which can be effectively strengthened in the field of education. In security policy, Germany, Europe, and the West must not leave the initiative to Russia and must step up efforts to counter regional security threats. This should preferably be done preventively in order to counter developments such as in Mali or the Central African Republic in good time, and should include civilian and development policy means. All instruments should be critically reviewed for their effectiveness to date and adjusted if necessary. Last but not least, it seems crucial to closely coordinate all efforts nationally and with European, Western and African partners.