

**Workshop:**  
**“Strategic Reactions of Secondary Powers in South America”**  
**1 December 2011, Hotel Altamira Continental - Caracas, Venezuela**

**Final Program**

- 14: 00 **Welcome address**  
Daniel Flemes (GIGA) and Heinrich Sassenfeld (FES-ILDIS)
- 14:10 **Theoretical approaches to the foreign policy of South American States**  
Peter Birle (Ibero-American Institute, Berlin)
- 14: 30 **Strategic reactions of secondary powers in South America**  
Daniel Flemes and Leslie Wehner (GIGA)
- 14:50 Comments: Peter Birle (Ibero-American Institute, Berlin)
- 15:00 *Discussion*
- Panel I: The Impact of change and continuity of national leadership on the foreign policies of Colombia and Venezuela**  
Chair: Friedrich Welsch (Universidad Simón Bolívar)
- 15:30 Carlos A. Romero (Universidad Central de Venezuela)  
15:45 Martha Ardila (Universidad Javeriana)
- 16:00 *Discussion*
- 16:30 Break
- Panel II: The impact of domestic actors on the foreign policy strategies of Colombia and Venezuela**  
Chair: Flavio Carucci (FES-ILDIS)
- 16:45 Eduardo Pastrana (Universidad Javeriana)  
17:00 Francine Jácome (INVESP)  
17:15 Elsa Cardozo (Universidad Metropolitana)
- 17:30 *Discussion*
- 18:00 Break
- Panel III: Perceptions of Brazil’s foreign policy in Colombia and Venezuela**  
Chair: Heinrich Sassenfeld (FES-ILDIS)
- 18:30 Benjamín Herrera Chaves (Universidad Javeriana)  
18:45 Fernando Gerbasi (Universidad Metropolitana)
- 19:00 *Discussion*
- 19:30 **Conclusions and final words**  
Eduardo Pastrana, Carlos A. Romero & Leslie Wehner
- 20:00 **Dinner**

**Panel I: Impact of change and continuity of national leadership on the foreign policies of Colombia and Venezuela**

Which is the impact of the ruling coalition and the national leadership on the foreign policy strategies of secondary powers such as Venezuela and Colombia vis-à-vis Brazil? Does the ideological orientation of the ruling party alongside the axis left-right have an influence on the readiness to accept or contest the Brazilian claim to leadership? It is interesting to elucidate the impact of the presidential leadership change on the foreign policy orientation of Colombia toward Brazil and the region, that is, from the Presidencies of Álvaro Uribe to Juan Manuel Santos. For Venezuela, it seems to be more important the continuity of Hugo Chávez' leadership in the foreign policy process in general and towards Brazil in particular. Within this frame it is also important to analyze whether an eventual change in leadership either within the revolutionary process or beyond may trigger change in the external strategy towards Brazil.

Carlos A. Romero (Venezuela); Martha Ardila (Colombia)

**Panel II: The impact of domestic actors on the foreign policy strategies of Colombia and Venezuela**

What is the role of sub-national actors and their interests in the foreign policy strategies of secondary powers towards Brazil? In this sense, liberalizing or protectionist commercial interests may shape bilateral relations with Brazil. The armed forces are another important factor inasmuch as their interests and ideas are congruent or not with the new regional security architecture induced by the South American Defense Council. Lastly, other actors of the civil society such as social movements sympathetic with different visions of the existing regional order and epistemic communities may also provide an input to foreign policy-making in this matter.

Eduardo Pastrana (Colombia); Francine Jácome, Elsa Cardozo (Venezuela)

**Panel III: Perceptions of Brazil's foreign policy in Colombia and Venezuela**

The different perceptions of national elites involved in the process of foreign policy-making are certainly an important element to explain the attitude and strategic reactions of secondary powers vis-à-vis Brazil's position within South America. Brazil's rising process can be perceived as a threat or as an opportunity to the national interests and security as defined by the Colombian and Venezuelan foreign policy elites. Such perceptions are also related to Brazil's global aspirations, e.g. the legitimacy of Brazilian claims of representing South America in the G20 or at the UN Security Council might be contested by secondary powers.

Benjamín Herrera Chaves (Colombia); Fernando Gerbasi (Venezuela)